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CENTENNIAL VOLUME 




Those who don’t know history are destined to repeat it. 
  —Edmund Burke 
 
This section of the centennial volume’s second issue is devoted to 
republishing articles from the early pages of the Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology (JCLC or Journal) that speak to the history of the Journal 
and its perennial commitment to leading scholarship.  These five pieces 
attempt to achieve the second half of this dual aim by showing how, nearly 
a century ago, our authors considered issues that dominate recent public 
discourse.  These articles confront today’s most controversial and important 
matters, from immigration to corporate responsibility, and contemporary 
debate echoes the concerns and themes of these historic writings.  In 
addition, the historic writings are illustrative of the core debates of our 
society and the value they have for addressing those debates that continue 
to the present.  Moreover, the authors whose works are reprinted herein 
very much embody the Journal’s institutional aims and evolution. 
1. Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to be Learned from Military Justice 
John Henry Wigmore, former dean of Northwestern University School 
of Law, is the author of the first article, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to 
Be Learned from Military Justice.1  More than the head of the law school, 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; Centennial Editor, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 100. 
1 John H. Wigmore, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to Be Learned from Military 
Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1919). 
310 Amy DeLine [Vol. 100 
Wigmore was instrumental in founding JCLC and a frequent contributor to 
its pages;2 Lessons for Civilian Justice is just one of the many articles he 
published in the Journal over the years.  The appearance of his portrait at 
the beginning of every volume is a testament to his unparalleled importance 
to this periodical. 
Lessons for Civilian Justice was selected for republication here not 
only because of Wigmore’s legacy, but because of its account of the 
differences between the American civilian and military justice systems.  In  
this article, Wigmore suggested that in some ways the military system is 
fairer—affords more due process—than are civilian courts.  While he 
conceded that “[j]ustice is always secondary” to the goal of victory within 
military courts, Wigmore nevertheless argued that civilian courts can learn 
from their military counterparts.3 
Wigmore’s candor and even-handedness is largely absent in post-
September 11th America and, particularly, in the current debate about the 
appropriate forum—military or civilian—for prosecuting alleged terrorists.  
The two sides of the modern debate have grown increasingly dogmatic 
since President Obama and Attorney General Holder reaffirmed their 
commitment in January 2010 to prosecute in civilian court five conspirators 
believed responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001.4  Supporters 
applaud the administration’s commitment to due process and its willingness 
to move the accused out of the notorious military commissions.5  On the 
other side, detractors, beyond arguing that terrorists do not deserve access 
to federal courts, worry about the security risk of a civilian trial and the 
 
2 Dean Wigmore came up with the idea to use the fiftieth anniversary of Northwestern 
University School of Law as an opportunity to hold a national conference of criminal law 
scholars, practitioners, and criminologists.  At that conference, JCLC was born.  For more 
information on the founding of the Journal, see Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the 
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7 
(2010); Amy DeLine & Adair Crosley, Foreword, A Century of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2010). 
3 Wigmore, supra note 1, at 170. 
4 Kenneth R. Bazinet et al., So Long, Terror Thug.  White House Abandons Plan to Hold 
Khalid Trial in Manhattan¸ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, at 5.  The Attorney General 
and Department of Justice originally announced that the alleged terrorists would be tried in a 
federal civilian court in November, 2009.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t 
of Def., Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions for Ten 
Guantanamo Bay Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ 
November/09-ag-1224.html.  For information on the suspects themselves and the process 
leading-up to Attorney General Holder’s announcement, see Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric 
Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52. 
5 See Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. 
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potential exposure of state secrets;6 they further question the rationale for a 
civilian trial given Attorney General Holder’s public acknowledgement that 
if the defendants are acquitted, the government might transfer them back to 
military detainment.7  Rather than acknowledge the validity of the 
counterpoints, both sides dig their heels in further.8 
Dean Wigmore wrote about the court martial system, not the military 
commissions that are at issue today, and terrorists were not at the center of 
his inquiry.  Even so, the current deadlocked debate and the government’s 
choice to hold the “trial of the century” in a civilian court would benefit 
from the kind of honest balancing Wigmore puts forth.9 
2. Crime and Immigration and The Treatment of Aliens in Criminal Courts 
Counsel to the Italian Consulate and the head of the Immigrants’ 
Protective League at Jane Addam’s historic Hull House authored the second 
and third historical articles, respectively, republished in this issue.10  
Together, the two authors, Gino C. Speranza and Grace Abbott, served on 
the crime and immigration committee (Committee G) of the American 
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, the organization that formed at 
the same time as the Journal itself and oversaw the Journal’s publication 
early-on.11  Through these roles, these two embody JCLC’s origins.  They 
also exemplify the Journal’s longstanding commitment to practitioner-
authors.  Abbott, a social worker and political scientist, represents the 
JCLC’s interdisciplinary focus, and, in 1911, she was one of the Journal’s 
first female authors. 
Abbott’s Treatment of Aliens in the Criminal Courts and Speranza’s 
Crime and Immigration both speak to the inequities faced by immigrants 
within the criminal justice system.12  While Crime and Immigration focuses 
on the discriminatory laws themselves, Treatment of Aliens draws on 
 
6 Id.; Bazinet et al., supra note 4. 
7 See Warren Richey, Holder: ‘Failure Not an Option’ in New York 9/11 Terror Trial, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 19, 2009, at 4. 
8 Mayer, supra note 4 (describing protests held in New York City by both supporters and 
opponents of the decision to give the avowed terrorists civilian criminal trials). 
9 When he first announced the civilian trial, Attorney General Holder referred to it as 
“the trial of the century.”  Id. 
10 See Henry B. Leonard, The Immigrants’ Protective League of Chicago 1908-1921, 66 
J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 271, 271-74 (1973) (describing the Protective League and Grace 
Abbott’s role in chairing it). 
11 For more information on the history of the American Institute and its oversight of the 
Journal, see Devroye, supra note 2. 
12 Grace Abbott, The Treatment of Aliens in the Criminal Courts, 2 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 554 (1911); Gino C. Speranza, Crime and Immigration, 2 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1911). 
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Abbott’s experiences as an advocate for immigrants’ rights as a source of 
anecdotal accounts of unjust treatment.  These accounts eloquently convey 
the increasing criminalization of alien status—immigrants arrested for 
being immigrants. 
Abbott explained that most immigrants at the time were arrested for 
vague “public policy” violations, and others were often arrested for no 
crime at all.  This is not to say that immigrants did not commit genuine 
crimes—of course some did—and, indeed, Speranza closed his article with 
this very observation.  However, he went on to clarify that the crimes of 
some do not warrant the maltreatment of the entire immigrant population 
and that discrimination within the justice system only exacerbates 
criminality among immigrants by fostering a disrespect for American law.  
“‘In the end,’” Speranza wrote, “‘the best of us would rebel against a 
judicial system which did not furnish a substantially effective defense 
against palpable recurring injustice.’”13 
The immigrants from Eastern Europe of Speranza and Abbott’s time 
have been replaced today largely by immigrants from Mexico, but the 
authors’ sentiments are nevertheless relevant to the immigration issues that 
have long divided modern lawmakers.  When Arizona passed a 
controversial immigration bill in early 2010,14 these early-twentieth century 
authors’ words became all the more salient.  Arizona’s new law, which 
permits police officers to detain anyone they suspect may be in the country 
illegally, has sparked unprecedented controversy.15  Critics, including 
President Obama, have deemed the law unfair and labeled it an “open 
invitation for harassment and discrimination against Hispanics regardless of 
their citizenship status.”16  Much like the laws Abbott wrote about, 
Arizona’s law has been harshly condemned as permitting arrests based 
solely on ethnicity or perceived ethnicity.17 
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, on the other hand, has maintained that 
the new law is necessary in a state plagued by illegal immigration.18  
According to Brewer, the law was designed to strengthen the “porous” 
 
13 Speranza, supra note 12, at 547 (quoting himself). 
14 See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2010, at A1. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Experts Join Criticism of Arizona Immigration Law, 
REUTERS.COM, May 11, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64A42Z20100511. 
18 See Archibold, supra note 14. 
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border with Mexico and not to facilitate racial profiling.19  Ostensibly, many 
of her constituents agree: Arizonans overwhelmingly support the law.20 
The influx of illegal immigrants to Arizona is undeniable.  Perhaps 
Governor Brewer is right, and the law will curb illegal border-crossing and 
do so without the intense discrimination President Obama and others fear.  
The law may very well become the prototype for other state laws and even 
federal legislation.  But while this remains to be seen, it is worth 
questioning now—as Speranza did nearly one hundred years ago—the 
wisdom of a law that ostensibly targets both legal and illegal immigrants 
alike.  Or asking—as Abbott did early last century—whether 
criminalization is the best response to immigration.  As a country, we must 
contemplate the best comprehensive course of action to address 
immigration because “[e]ven if we think it wisdom to shut the gates to 
further invasion,” as Speranza wrote, “there is still the problem of those 
already within.”21 
3. Children in Our Prisons 
Thorsten Sellin was a criminologist at the University of Pennsylvania, 
where the Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law now bears 
his name.22  He was president of the International Society of Criminology, 
secretary general of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 
and the editor of the Annals of American Academy of Political and Social 
Science for nearly four decades.23  Sellin often advised the FBI and the 
Census Bureau on criminal statistics, and he headed various UN panels on 
criminology matters.24  In short, he personifies both the scholar-practitioner 
intersection that JCLC strives for and the criminology half of the Journal. 
Sellin’s piece that is reprinted here, Children in Our Prisons, is a short 
two pages.25  The article succinctly gives then-current data regarding 
juvenile imprisonment in adult penitentiaries.  In his brief introduction to 
the statistics, Sellin discusses the belief within the American criminal 
justice system that children should be treated differently than adults.  “In 
 
19 Craig Harris et al., Arizona Governor Signs Immigration Law; Foes Promise Fight¸ 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2010, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/04/23/ 
20100423arizona-immigration-law-passed.html. 
20 Id. 
21 Speranza, supra note 12, at 547. 
22 Eric Pace, Thorsten Sellin, Criminology Expert, Dies at 97, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
1994, at D22. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Thorsten Sellin, Children in Our Prisons, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
839 (1933). 
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spite of these professed beliefs,” Sellin admonished, “we constantly fall 
short of our ideals.”26 
On May 17, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an 
opinion that reflected the beliefs referred to by Sellin.27  In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court held that juveniles cannot be imprisoned for life without the 
possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes; such a sentence constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.28  Writing for 
the majority in Graham v. Florida, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
juveniles are less morally culpable than adults and therefore less deserving 
of harsh sentences.29  Juvenile sentences of life imprisonment without 
parole fail to account for this distinction in culpability by inflicting more 
severe sentences on youths than adults.30  Kennedy warns against ignoring 
the fact that “a juvenile offender [sentenced to life in prison] will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than 
an adult offender [sentenced to life in prison].”31  In the eyes of the Court, 
then, the sentence of life without the possibility of parole cannot be justified 
or tolerated any longer.32 
Three quarters of a century after his writing, the Court’s opinion does 
exactly what Sellin called for: it enacts the ideal that children are deserving 
of different treatment within the criminal justice system. 
4. Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct 
The fifth and final historic article reprinted here was selected to 
represent the law student role in producing the Journal.  Terence P. Fagan 
served on JCLC’s student editorial board for two years, first as a staff editor 
and subsequently as a Note and Comment Editor.33  Moreover, during his 
second year with JCLC—his third year of law school—Fagan authored and 
published Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct 
alongside W. Allen Spurgeon.34 
 
26 Id. at 839. 
27 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
28 Id. at 2030. 
29 Id. at 2026-27. 
30 Id. at 2028. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 2030. 
33 In his latter capacity, Fagan helped his fellow students prepare articles for 
publication—a role fitting for a student whose own work was chosen for print. 
34 W. Allen Spurgeon & Terence P. Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering 
Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400 (1981).  Spurgeon, like Abbott, 
Speranza, and Sellin, was a practitioner-author.  At the time of writing, he was a litigator in 
private practice in Colorado.  Id. 
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Criminal Liability, published in 1981, does not date back to the 
beginning of the Journal like the other articles republished in this issue.  
Less than thirty years old, Fagan and Spurgeon’s piece is nevertheless 
included here because it was written just as corporate criminal liability 
began to dominate public policy discourse.  The authors wrote the article in 
response to a bill Senator Edward Kennedy introduced in 1979 that made it 
a crime for companies to knowingly imperil the lives of their employees, 
consumers, or the public at large.35  Fagan and Spurgeon, in contemplating 
the “endangerment offense” legislation, grappled not only with the 
legitimacy of the crime but, more specifically, with the moral 
blameworthiness of corporate conduct; the appropriate punishment; and 
most crucially, society’s desire to encourage corporate innovation and 
productivity while protecting public health and safety.  
Thirty years later, the exact kind of life-endangering incident Spurgeon 
and Fagan wrote about, and which Senator Kennedy introduced legislation 
to address, occurred.  On April 20, 2010, a BP oil-rig off the coast of 
Louisiana exploded and continued to spill oil into the Gulf of Mexico until 
July 15, 2010.36  Dubbed the “worst environmental disaster America has 
ever faced,”37 it claimed the lives of eleven workers in the initial fire and 
devastated the Gulf, its wildlife, and the economies that lie along its 
shores.38  Lawmakers and citizens alike are calling for criminal charges for 
BP and its top executives.39 
 
35 The provision for the “endangerment offense,” as Spurgeon and Fagan labeled it, was 
included in Kennedy’s broader Federal Criminal Code Reform Act, which in addition to 
including various corporate crimes, sought to reform criminal sentencing and streamline the 
U.S. Criminal Code.  Edward M. Kennedy, Federal Criminal Code: An Overview, 47 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 451 (1979). 
36 Plug in Gulf Well Is Declared a Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010, at A12. 
37 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill 
(June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
nation-bp-oil-spill. 
38 Robertson & Kaufman, supra note 36; Amy Schoenfeld, Where BP’s Money Is 
Landing, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2010, at BU1.  Estimates suggest more than 60,000 barrels of 
oil (i.e., 2.5 million gallons) leaked into the Gulf on a daily basis.  Justin Gillis, Estimates of 
Oil Flow Jump Higher¸ N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/us/16spill.html?ref=gulf_of_mexico_2010.  If these 
estimates are correct, an amount of oil equivalent to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 
escaped into the Gulf of Mexico every four days before the well was capped.  Id. 
39 Steven Mufson & Theresa Vargas, As Outcry Grows, Investors Batter BP; Firm’s 
Value Plunges $21 Billion in a Day as Criminal Probe Begins, WASH. POST, June 2, 2010, at 
A1.  BP also faces civil liability for its actions.  Id.  Congress is acting swiftly to remove the 
current statutory cap that would limit BP’s liability to $75 million in damages to individuals 
impacted by the spill.  Scott Neuman, Extent of BP’s Liability Still Murky, NPR.COM, June 9, 
2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127561028.  Likewise, the 
President demanded BP pay for the damage it caused, called for tighter regulations of the oil 
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The Department of Justice responded to these outcries in early June, 
2010 when it announced the onset of a criminal investigation of BP.40  It 
remains unclear, however, exactly what charges the company might face.  
Some speculate that the government will simply pursue criminal sanctions 
under the Clean Water Act,41 while others suggest that the government will 
pursue racketeering charges for the company’s continued, willful violation 
of government regulations,42 and still others have gone as far as proposing 
involuntary manslaughter charges for the loss of the eleven victims.43  
Whatever course the government pursues, the popular consensus is that 
criminal prosecution is inevitable and that BP deserves to be punished for 
endangering the lives of so many. 
While BP’s culpability may be obvious to (at least some segments of) 
the public, choosing an appropriate course of action will likely not be 
simple for the Department of Justice.  Prosecutors will inevitably struggle 
with the very issues Fagan and Spurgeon addressed.  And much like 
Criminal Liability concludes, the type of case the government pursues is 
likely to require the government to strike a balance, calculating how to 
punish BP’s morally culpable behavior and deter other incidents of life-





industry, and imposed a plenary ban on deepwater drilling.  President Barack Obama, supra 
note 37. 
40 Mufson & Vargas, supra note 39. 
41 John Schwartz, Costs to BP Would Soar Under Criminal Charges N.Y. TIMES, June 
17, 2010, at A18. 
42 Paul M. Bartlett & Justin Blum, The Oil Spill: Will BP Face Criminal Charges?, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, July 1, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
10_28/b4186024400208.htm. 
43 Paul Abrams, Precedent for BP Criminal Responsibility: The Cocoanut Grove Fire 
(1942)¸ HUFFINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-
abrams/precedent-for-bp-criminal_b_590426.html. 
